Category Archives: Title VII

A New Standard for Workplace Discrimination after Muldrow v. City of St. Louis

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Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), resets the bar for Title VII discrimination claims. The plaintiff, a police sergeant, alleged an involuntary transfer replaced her with a male officer and imposed less desirable duties, schedule changes, and loss of job privileges, though rank and pay stayed constant. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal under a “material employment disadvantage” test, which the Supreme Court rejected as inconsistent with Title VII’s text and structure. The Supreme Court’s opinion resolves a long-standing circuit split over whether Title VII requires “significant” harm for discrimination claims that do not involve economic losses or formal demotions

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that an employee alleging a discriminatory transfer “must show some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment,” but that such harm “need not be significant” to violate Title VII. The Court rejected circuit rules demanding a “material employment disadvantage” or other heightened adversity showing, explaining that importing a significance test adds words that Congress did not enact into Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination “with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”.

Core standard clarified

Title VII plaintiffs must prove discriminatory treatment and a resulting identifiable injury to the job’s terms, conditions, or privileges, but the injury need only be some harm rather than a heightened “significant” or “material” harm. The Court emphasized that discrimination means being made worse off because of a protected characteristic, and nothing in the statute scales how much worse off one must be; requiring “significance” imposes hurdles contrary to the statute’s plain language.

What counts as “some harm”

The decision requires a tangible, job-related detriment—changes to duties, schedules, prestige, responsibilities, or privileges can qualify if they concretely alter terms or conditions. In Muldrow, the alleged harms included loss of specialized responsibilities and prestige, schedule changes, and loss of an unmarked take-home vehicle, illustrating how non-pay consequences can meet the threshold when tied to job terms or conditions. The Court did not catalog every qualifying harm or define “some” with precision, leaving lower courts to apply the standard case by case.

Broader implications

By lowering the degree-of-harm threshold, the Court made it easier for discrimination claims based on transfers to proceed past pleading and summary judgment, particularly where prior circuit precedent demanded “material” adversity. The ruling is not confined to transfers; its reasoning applies across Title VII discrimination claims so long as the plaintiff shows some injury to identifiable terms or conditions of employment caused by protected-class discrimination. The decision still may leave intact separate, higher adversity standards in retaliation cases, which many courts continue to frame as requiring “materially adverse” actions in that distinct context.

Supreme Court Lowers Bar for “Reverse Discrimination” Lawsuits

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In today’s (6/5/2025) Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Srvcs. ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimously made it easier for individuals from majority groups to bring workplace discrimination claims, often referred to as “reverse discrimination” lawsuits. The ruling involves a woman who alleged she was denied a promotion and later demoted because of her sexual orientation. The plaintiff argued that these decisions were motivated by bias against her as a heterosexual woman and that her employer favored LGBTQ employees. Previously, lower court had required members of a majority group to show not only the standard elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but also to provide additional evidence—so-called “background circumstances”—suggesting her employer was unusually likely to discriminate against majority group members. The Supreme Court concluded that the evidentiary standard for discrimination claims should be uniform, regardless of the claimant’s identity.

It’s important to note that the Supreme Court did not rule on whether Ames actually suffered discrimination. Instead, the justices focused solely on the legal standard required to bring such a case to trial. Ames’s lawsuit now returns to the lower courts for further proceedings under the new, less stringent standard.

Are Managers that Investigate Discrimination Protected From Retaliation?

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In addition to prohibiting job discrimination on the basis of  race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, Title VII contains an Opposition Clause to protect workers from retaliation for advancing claims under the statute.   Typically, the Courts have defined “opposition” broadly to include a  variety of conduct in opposition to unlawful employment practices, including both formal grievances and informal complaints.  In Demasters v. Carilion Clinic,  the Fourth Circuit recently considered whether a manager, who failed to support a pro-management position in another employee’s sexual harassment complaint, himself engaged in protected opposition under Title VII.

At issue in DeMasters is the proper application of the “manager rule,” a doctrine applied by some courts that requires an employee to be acting outside of a management role in order to engage in protected activity.  When applied, managers that routinely accept, investigate or evaluate complaints of other employees are not participating in protected activity when performing their regular job duties.  After consideration, however, the Fourth Circuit rejected a per se extension of the “managers rule” to Title VII, holding that “the only qualification placed upon an employee’s invocation of protection from retaliation under Title VII’s Opposition Clause is that the manner his opposition must be reasonable.”

Demasters v. Carilion Clinic (Fourth Circuit, August 10, 2015)

Supreme Court Clarifies Standard for Supervisor Liability in Harassment Cases

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Under Title VII, an employer may be liable for the workplace harassment of employees that is based on sex, race, religion or national origin.   The standard for liability often begins with the employment position of the alleged harasser.  When the harasser is a co-worker, a plaintiff must show that the company had knowledge of continuous and pervasive harassing behavior and failed to take remedial action.  Additionally, an employer can defend a claim by proving that an employee failed to utilize available corrective measures such as an internal HR complaint procedure.

However, when the alleged harasser is a supervisor, the standard for liability changes if the supervisor takes a tangible, adverse action against an employee.  In such cases, an employer may be vicariously liable for the conduct of its supervisors.  In Vance v. Ball St. University (April 2013), the U.S. Supreme Court provides clarification regarding the very definition of a supervisor under Title VII.    In a 5-4 decision, Vance holds that an employee is a supervisor “if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”   Inversely stated, a supervisor is not someone who merely has some nebulous authority to instruct or direct another person in the performance of their duties.